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This is a critical introduction to the special issue on the fundamental rights of states. Whether such 
rights exist, the bounds of their existence, or whether they ought to be striven towards are questions 
of considerable import in the wake of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, or even given the ongoing 
Palestinian struggle for permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. I briefly outline how 
we might consider the question: is there any progressive political value in buttressing the state 
and its autonomy, through the doctrine of fundamental rights, in today’s neoliberal world? First, 
I examine how we may progressively look at fundamental rights—as doctrine, narrative, memory 
or discourse. Second, I question the extent to which it is useful to see competing subjectivities, ie 
the maligned state against technocratic institutions, in a time where neoliberal logic has come to 
structure the workings of the state. It becomes quickly apparent that the discourse of fundamental 
rights may be used to both resist neoliberalism and enable it.
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We should not speak solely of the doctrine of the fundamental rights of states. To insist 
on such a reduction is to do a disservice to a topic that goes to the heart of international 
law. This critical introduction to the special issue seeks to broaden the lens with which 
we may view the subject-matter, urging international lawyers to grasp both the difficult 
and penetrating questions it unearths as well as their contemporary relevance.
What is the nature of the state? What characteristics or capacities, if any, inhere in 
the very designation ‘state’? Is it possible to speak of the ‘fundamental rights of states’ as 
strictly legal rights, or is there normative value in seeing it as some other form of legal 
discourse? What precise notion of order does ‘fundamental’ entail or what character 
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comments. This symposium owes a great deal to the work and organisation of Daniel H Joyner, Marco 
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does this ascribe to the rights themselves? How does the doctrine relate to the weakened 
autonomy of the state in today’s geopolitical landscape? The subject of this special 
issue presupposes and presents answers to some of these questions, whilst urging us to 
confront others. From my own perspective there is a key question that brings the topic 
of fundamental rights of states to contemporary relevance. It is this: is there any political 
value in buttressing the state and its autonomy, through the doctrine of fundamental 
rights, in today’s neoliberal world? 
The state is apparently ailing. Late twentieth century thought in economic, political 
and legal fields announced its demise. Not to mention that within each field, strands of 
thought spanning back over two centuries or more have advocated for said demise, if 
not the state’s outright abolition. Contemporarily, it was assailed from the political right 
by free market ideology and significant challenges to its relative authority by neoliberal 
international institutions. From the political left, ‘progressive’ voices continue to be 
animated by a sentiment articulated by Nietzsche: ‘State is the name of the coldest of 
all cold monsters. It even lies coldly, and this lie crawls out of its mouth: “I, the state, 
am the people.” This is a lie!’1 It is a thought that has driven important research across 
social, political, economic and legal fields, all the while intellectually undoing the state’s 
privileged position in certain policy spheres.2 
No doubt, these broad intellectual trends have helped undermine the autonomy 
and political authority of the state. But both trends encourage an underlying intellectual 
stance of functionalism. Here, the state is seen as only one actor or mechanism through 
which the obligations and functions of the state can be fulfilled. Where the state fails, 
one can defer to the international community or to the market (or to private actors, etc) 
to fulfil its requisite functions.3 The state becomes instrumentalised—and sees (and at 
times, willingly embraces) itself this way—for the fulfilment of particular interests and 
in the process is reduced to being as much use as any other actor or mechanism. In 
the words of the political theorist Wendy Brown: ‘[T]he state must not simply concern 
itself with the market but think and behave like a market actor across all of its functions, 
including law.’4 There is no longer any value that inheres in its capacity to represent 
diverse groups of peoples, or the manner in which it may conduct this representation. 
Indeed, the state’s capacity to conduct this ‘representation’ has become seriously curtailed. 
It is this transformation of the state that goes to the heart of the matter. So often, and 
correctly, considered an oppressor of its ‘peoples’, it is of little surprise that it has been 
undone as a potential bulwark against forms of oppression imposed by unaccountable 
1 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Adrian del Caro and Robert Pippin eds, Adrian del Caro tr, 
CUP 2006) 34.
2 For an overview in international legal thought, see Oscar Schachter, ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and 
its Implications for International Law’ (1998) 36 Columbia J Transnatl L 7.
3 For a recent exploration of this established theme in international legal thought, see Anne Orford, 
‘Constituting Order’ in James Crawford and Martti Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge Companion to 
International Law (CUP 2012) 271.
4 Wendy Brown, ‘Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy’ in Wendy Brown (ed), Edgework: 
Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton UP 2005) 42 (emphasis in original).
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international economic institutions or private actors. It is this situation that must be 
changed.
I do not argue that there is any inherent value in sustaining the state’s autonomy. 
If anything, such advocacy is the precise juncture at which, as history has taught us, 
healthy scepticism is necessary. Rather, I tentatively suggest that hand in hand with such 
scepticism, it may be politically progressive and necessary in today’s neoliberal world 
to find strategic ways in which to buttress the state’s autonomy, and hence its political 
authority. This position is founded on three beliefs. First, that the state may offer greater 
accountability, participation and processes allowing for change for today’s citizens, if 
contrasted with the technocracy that governs today’s international economic and public 
institutions. Second, that if given the correct tools, it may possibly act as a barricade 
against greater and perhaps more normalised forms of oppression found in some of 
today’s international institutions. I return to these first two beliefs below. And third, that 
it is the task of legal thought to change the status quo. Not merely to describe it or to 
evaluate it. The duty of the legal scholar does not lie in positive legal inquiry, but rather 
to look for spaces for contestation and transformation, whilst not over-determining or 
under-determining these spaces.
It is with these considerations in mind that we come to the legal discourse of the 
fundamental rights of states. I have chosen to speak of our subject matter as a legal 
discourse rather than doctrine for both theoretical and historical reasons. As a matter 
of theory, international law’s normative authority is not strictly and solely limited to 
and vested in its ‘rules’ or ‘norms’. Rules—whether rights, duties, secondary or primary, 
specific or of general applicability—may be the main currency for international law’s 
normative authority. But they are almost certainly not its only source. It is possible to 
speak international law in the language of standards and principles. Think of the tired 
debate regarding soft law, just as large swathes of the field have become established, 
defined and continue to proliferate with this often vitiatingly vague form of regulation. 
Here, international law’s normative authority is not strictly officiated in the form of an 
on/off switch.5 This anti-positivist theoretical stance—namely, the belief that it is possible 
to speak international law with a degree of normative authority without speaking of 
strictly legal rules or norms—is further supported by historical practice in the sphere of 
the fundamental rights of states. 
When Ricardo Alfaro gave his Hague Academy lecture in 1959, he noted how specific 
‘fundamental liberties’6 were called ‘attributes, qualities, competencies, powers, norms or 
rights.’7 Up to and beyond this historical juncture, the discourse of fundamental liberties 
had provided protective umbrage to a number of states that sat at international law’s 
margins (particularly inter-American states) despite—and possibly because of—its vague, 
5 See further Sahib Singh, ‘Narrative and Theory: Formalism’s Recurrent Return’ (2013) 84 BYBIL 304, 
334–36.
6 I borrow this from Stephen C Neff, ‘The Dormancy, Rise and Decline of Fundamental Liberties of States’ 
(2015) 4 CJICL 482.
7 Ricardo J Alfaro, ‘The Rights and Duties of States’ (1959) II Recueil des Cours 116.
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general and indeterminate conceptual character. In the 1930s and late-1940s, there were 
attempts to develop a positive legal doctrine, attempts that were again taken up post-
decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s. But as both Jean d’Aspremont and Stephen Neff 
note in this symposium, the protective function and capacity of the discourse was all but 
‘annihilated’ in these attempts to delimit and squeeze it into positive form. In short, the 
normative legal authority and politically progressive capacity of the fundamental rights of 
states lay in its discursive flexibility, and its capacity to tap into a political understanding 
of rights within legal frameworks.8
And yet, some contemporary international lawyers are far from optimistic about 
the contemporary political possibilities of fundamental rights discourse. Antonios 
Tzanakopoulos, in this special issue, relates the doctrine to the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis. He demonstrates that there is no positive right, let alone fundamental right, to 
be free from economic coercion, nor any doctrine of fundamental rights of states ‘in 
any meaningful sense.’9 Therefore, he concludes that the legal doctrine—and the specific 
rights it may encompass—is of no political relevance to the Greek sovereign debt crisis 
and the developments that have occurred this year. Rather, ‘the way to cure the world of 
this ill is politics, political struggle in particular. Politics can establish fundamental rights 
of states as a legal category; political struggle can change the law.’10 For Tzanakopoulos, 
law can only speak when there is a determinate, positive legal norm that can be identified 
and posited against another actor. Law only carries normative authority in the form of 
a legal rule, norm, or in this case, right. And we can only use law to engage in political 
struggle once it has adopted this strict form, for without it law is incapable, powerless 
and normatively inert. And in this understanding, politics is cast outside the law—first, 
before the law (creating it) or under it (where law, once created, can speak to power). For 
Tzanakopoulos, the ‘discussion of fundamental rights of states thus should not be seen as 
some independent legal category, but at best as an argumentative practice or as a narrative 
of resistance.’11 Not only is there no place for progressive political struggle within the law, 
enmeshed into the very fabric of how we may speak it, but there is the declaration that, 
in this context, law cannot speak or be spoken. Not only does this approach suffer from 
historical amnesia, but it also sustains an ideological approach to law that embeds the 
status quo, forcing the international lawyer towards resigned passivity.
That the inter-American states in the early 1930s and throughout the mid-to-late 
1940s and decolonised states in the 1960s and mid-1970s chose to speak the language 
of fundamental rights of states in a politico-legal discourse—both strategic and 
argumentatively legal—is beyond doubt.12 But even if we learn this historical lesson, and 
8 Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Doctrine of Fundamental Rights of States and Anthropomorphic Thinking in 
International Law’ (2015) 4 CJICL 501; Neff (n 6).
9 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘The Right to be Free from Economic Coercion’ (2015) 4 CJICL 616, 633.
10 ibid.
11 ibid (emphasis added).
12 See, generally, International Law Commission, ‘Preparatory Study Concerning a Draft Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of States—Memorandum submitted by the Secretary General’ (15 December 1948) 
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the discourse of fundamental rights can be seen as a legal ground from which political 
struggle may be waged, it does not answer how this discourse may fare in our neoliberal 
times. Nor should it enshrine an a-critical willingness to support this legal discourse. 
Even if states can speak in this legal discourse—with its attendant rights, principles, or 
standards—for what particular purpose, against whom and how is it deployed? In the 
context of Greece and other states within Europe receiving forms of shock therapy this 
discourse may be used as a form of resistance against the European Central Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund and the European Commission. But even if it may, in the 
abstract, allow Greece to speak a legal discourse of resistance, it may also allow other, 
competing actors to shape the ecosystem in which this speech is rendered inconsequential. 
A discourse of resistance can, in other’s hands, enable repression. Think here of the total 
disregard for human rights obligations within the same context of Greece;13 the existence 
of a right does not render it consequential. In the context of the fundamental rights 
of states, the very same observation can be made; that we can speak through a legal-
political discourse does not necessarily mean that this discourse has purchase. 
If this is one way to frame the role of the fundamental rights of states in today’s 
neoliberal times, another way has been alluded to above. Namely, as a legal discourse 
that may be used to buttress the state and its autonomy against the intrusive political 
authority of technocratic international institutions. The logical, and political, premise 
of this frame is that it provides a choice between two competing subject-types and 
subjectivities; between two different ways of organising the social. The assumption is that 
in our neoliberal times we ought to provide protective umbrage to the maligned Hegelian 
state—the one that may represent its people. If the legal discourse of fundamental rights 
can aid in this venture, then it may be used as a tool for resistance; deployed by the state, 
through the state, against the hegemony of neoliberal institutions. But this frame and 
narrative may over-determine the space for resistance, especially for powerless states and 
any solidarity that may exist between such states.
What if we are to understand neoliberalism as a material political rationality? If it is 
no longer purely an economic rationality concretised in the Bretton Woods institutions 
and their successors, but is rather supported, sustained and emboldened by the state? 
What if we understand the market as no longer controlled by the state, but rather as 
having become the organising principle of the state? Surely then, to buttress the state’s 
autonomy would be a futile gesture. What if we accept Wendy Brown’s contention that 
‘the health and growth of the economy is the basis of state legitimacy?’14 These sets of 
questions turn the logical frame in the previous paragraph on its head. 
The political stance no longer becomes one of supporting competing subjects 
and their subjectivities, ie the maligned state against technocratic institutions. The 
UN Doc A/CN.4/2, 5–9; (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625; (17 December 1973) UN Doc A/
RES/28/3171.
13 See Margot Salomon, ‘Europe’s Debt to Greece’ (EJIL: Talk!, 24 August 2015) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/
europes-debt-to-greece/> accessed 28 October 2015.
14 Brown (n 4) 42.
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question that becomes key to progressive politics is: how far has neoliberalism eroded 
the democratic state? If you believe that the Hegelian state has entirely perished in 
neoliberalism, then to buttress the state would not only be folly, but it would enable the 
very forms of repression that one may have sought to challenge. From this perspective, 
the legal discourse of the fundamental rights of states no longer appears to be a space 
for dissent or transformation. Rather, this legal discourse may simply become another 
set of regulative principles that are likely to be subordinated to an economic rationality 
and instrumentalised by a state that marches in service to the market. However, if you 
believe, as I do, that the state may retain an ability to represent its diversity of peoples 
and shape the social through its mechanisms of liberal democracy, there remains resistive 
and political potential in buttressing it. The legal discourse on the fundamental rights 
of states—depending on how it is used, by whom and against whom—may in certain 
contexts be useful for various forms of transformative politics. 
The task of the international lawyer has now become considerably murkier. The legal 
discourse of fundamental liberties may be used to both resist neoliberalism and enable 
it. It may be used to strengthen the state. But which contemporary idea of the state 
is it strengthening? The international lawyer in their pursuit of transformative politics 
may be required to tread along the psychological lines of Susan Marks’ usage of Harold 
Bloom’s ‘the anxiety of influence’.15 It is not out of simple fear of irrelevance that we try 
and make the legal discourse of fundamental rights relevant to contemporary political 
issues, but that in this very act that we realise that this legal discourse and other legal 
discourses may be complicit in the very politics that we are trying to resist.
This critical introduction has sought to be suggestive of inquiry, aiming to provide 
certain framework considerations. Even if one is pessimistic about the existence of 
specific fundamental rights of states, as precisely that—fundamental rights—there is no 
doubt value in understanding them as a form of legal discourse. Whether its vitality can 
be used against neoliberal political and economic thought is one of the more pressing 
questions that one can pose. I have attempted to show that, whilst promising, this line 
of inquiry is anything but easy. But this is merely one of many contexts in which the 
question of fundamental rights is of contemporary relevance. Think quickly of the 
Palestinian state and the right to permanent sovereignty over its natural resources and 
its right to non-interference; think of Iran and the right to peaceful use of its nuclear 
energy, think of Israel and its right to existence. This handful of examples does not do 
the vibrancy of the topic justice. The papers that follow are not only doctrinally useful, 
contemporarily relevant and necessary, but also rooted in some of the more interesting 
questions that go to the heart and structure of our field.
15 Susan Marks, ‘State-centrism, International Law and Anxieties of Influence’ (2006) 19 LJIL 339, 347: ‘the 
anxiety of influence felt by international lawyers is not just a fear of irrelevance but a fear of relevance as 
well—not just a shock at the recognition of politics in law, but a shock at the recognition of law in politics’.
